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The recent global financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign default have rekindled the debate on the 
interactions between the real sector and the financial sphere. The present paper provides an assessment of the 
role of financial frictions on business cycles in Canada, the Euro Area, the U.K., and the U.S. during these recent 
financial crises using an extension of the DSGE methodology described by Merola (2015). The main goal is to 
examine whether and the extent to which those crises enhanced the contribution of financial frictions in driving 
macroeconomic fluctuations. The models’ properties are examined with posteriors distributions, variance 
decomposition, and historical decomposition. Posteriors distributions show that the role of real shocks in 
driving macroeconomic fluctuations decrease with the incorporation of financial frictions in the core DSGE 
model. Variance decomposition shows that financial frictions and financial shocks affect the business cycle 
through investment. The empirical estimates also suggest that the contribution of financial frictions and 
financial shocks in driving investment increases during the global financial crisis.  
 
KEYWORDS 




The recent financial crisis has drawn attention to the impact that financial frictions have on business 
cycle fluctuations. Furthermore, the amount of literature on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) and the financial system has been increasing in recent years. Some researchers focus on the 
source of financial frictions (see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, and Gerali et 
al., 2010), while others discuss the role of liquidity (Brunnermeir and Pedersen, 2009). Much of the 
literature proposes a different micro-foundation for financial frictions. Bernanke et al. (1999) remains 
the benchmark DSGE model for financial frictions, the authors introduce an agency problem between 
borrowers and lenders that make a wedge between the cost of external finance and the opportunity 
cost of internal resources. Their findings suggest that the external finance premium (EFP) decreases 
with the borrowers’ percentage stake in the outcome of an investment project. 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (BGG, 1999) influential financial accelerator is used frequently to 
analyze credit market imperfections in DSGE modeling. The BGG model features constrained firms that 




are the sources of frictions in the form of a costly state verification problem through asymmetric 
information between lenders or banks and borrowers or nonfinancial firms. Then, Gertler and Karadi 
(2011) presented a DSGE framework where financial frictions arise because of a moral hazard problem 
between lenders and financial intermediaries.  
The main objective of this study is to examine whether and the extent to which financial frictions 
play a role in driving business fluctuations during the recent financial crises using a Bayesian DSGE 
assessment. 
One of the main contributions of this article is a comparative analysis of the effects of financial 
frictions on economic fluctuations in Canada, the Eurozone, the U.K., and the U.S. The U.K. and the 
U.S. are chosen because these countries have the largest financial systems in the world. Financial 
frictions can therefore be expected to play a crucial role in economic cycles during financial crises in 
these two countries. The Eurozone is included to examine the role of credit frictions in economic 
activity fluctuations during the European debt crisis. Finally, Canada is included in our study in an 
attempt to understand why its economy was relatively resilient during the 2008 financial crisis. 
Our approach relies on a comparative analysis of the results from the DSGE methodology 
incorporating financial frictions described in Merola (2015), and those obtained from the core Smets 
and Wouters’ (2003, 2007) DSGE models. The estimates are conducted in different periods: (i) a pre-
crisis period covering 2000:Q1-2007:Q4 before the occurrence of the recent financial crises, (ii) a crisis 
period from 2000:Q1 to 2014:Q4, including the recent financial crises. The paper also focuses on the 
periods 2008:Q1-2009:Q3 and 2009:Q1-2013:Q4 corresponding to the peak of the global financial crisis 
and the Eurozone debt crisis, respectively. This allows us to see the size of financial frictions in driving 
business fluctuations at the epicenter of financial crises. To our knowledge, this the pioneer research 
putting into perspective the contribution of financial constraints to explain the economic outlook 
during the peak of recent crises within a DSGE model. The study digs deeper to understand whether 
the financial restraints that occurred (credit crunch and government debt crunch) have not simply 
eclipsed the worst fundamentals of economies. 
New to Merola (2015), our model introduces the entrepreneurs’ net worth variable, proxied by the 
value of the stock market index for each country/area as suggested by Alpanda and Aysun (2014). Next, 
our model also explicitly takes into consideration the net worth shock. Although Merola (2015) and 
Suh and Walker (2016) examine the role of financial frictions during 2008/2009 in the U.S., our study is 
the first that uses a Bayesian approach from a DSGE model with the same prior distributions for all the 
countries/areas. This assumption allows for a valid international comparison of the effects of financial 
frictions and financial shocks on the macroeconomics. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on DSGE models with 
financial frictions. Section 3 presents the linearized DSGE models with and without financial frictions. 
Data, priors, and posteriors estimates are discussed in Section 4. Using variance decompositions, 
Section 5 illustrates the main forces driving macro-economy during the pre-crisis period, the crisis 
period, at the peak of the crisis period, and during the Eurozone sovereign crisis. Section 6 presents 
historical decompositions in order to understand the individual contributions of each structural shock 
to the movements in output, consumption, and investment during the 2008 global financial crisis and 
the European debt crisis. Section 7 discusses the main findings across the world while Section 8 
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RELATED LITERATURE  
 
DSGE MODELS WITH FINANCIAL MARKET FRICTIONS 
 
This section reviews research regarding the general framework used for the specification of financial 
market frictions in DSGE models. In this paper, financial frictions are prime candidates for the 
endogenous amplification of small transitory nonfinancial shocks. Recent economic events, including 
the subprime mortgage crisis in the summer of 2007 and the debt crisis in 2008, led to the emergence 
of widespread interest in macroeconomic models that focus on financial frictions and disturbances. 
Alpanda and Aysun (2014) and Suh and Walker (2016) focus on the role that the financial sector plays 
in propagating shocks that originate in other sectors of the economy. These studies highlight the 
importance of the financial activity in business cycle fluctuations. However, there is no international 
comparative analysis of the role played by financial shocks in driving business activity across countries.  
Pre-crisis macroeconomic models rely only on the specifications of the real economy and neglect 
the financial sector, which is considered to be almost irrelevant in the context of low inflation rates. 
Moreover, the prevailing view among policymakers is that price stability alone could ensure 
macroeconomic stability. Therefore, policymakers generally embrace the idea that the deterioration 
of financial markets is just a reflection of a declining economy, even though, in reality, it might have 
been a factor that significantly affects business cycle dynamics. 
Pre-crisis operational macroeconomic models did not present a detailed specification of the 
financial sector; instead, these models focused mostly on the perturbations of the demand for credits. 
However, some attempts were made in the literature to tackle this problem. Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989) are pioneers in incorporating financial aspects into a DSGE model. This model is further 
developed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and later merges with the New Keynesian framework by 
BGG (1999). These studies demonstrate how the financial sector interacts with the business cycle 
through the financial accelerator mechanism. Frictions occur in these models through an external 
finance premium (EFP) between the lending rate and the risk-free rate.1  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, researchers have begun to look for new ways to 
improve the current macroeconomic models. For example, Gerali et al. (2010) study the role of credit-
supply factors in business cycle dynamics by including a competitive banking sector in a DSGE model. 
In their model, the only savings instrument is a bank deposit, and the only way to borrow is via a bank 
loan. Funds in the banking sector travel along the following path: The customer makes a deposit at a 
retail bank, and these funds are then transferred to the wholesale bank. The wholesale bank uses 
these funds along with the bank’s capital to supply loans to specialized retail banks that, in turn, 
provide loans to economic agents. Because retailers operate in a monopolistic environment, they put 
a markup over the policy interest rate for loans and under the policy rate for deposits. The retail banks 
obtain profits that are transferred to the wholesale bank, where only a fraction of profits remains in 
the banking sector while the rest is transferred to customers in the form of dividends. 
The modelling of financial frictions through the credit side differs. Using the financial accelerator 
mechanism, Akinci (2017) assumes that firms borrow in the international debt markets from risk 
neutral foreign lenders to purchase intermediate inputs. As foreign lenders are not able to observe 
the productivity of these firms, they charge a risk premium to the firms on their debt. Chatterjee (2019) 
documents the relevance of financial frictions in driving business cycles in emerging countries, 
especially when they interact with uncertainty shocks. In Chatterjee’s model, financial frictions reflect 
differences in borrowing costs across advanced and emerging countries. Therefore, the risk premium 
faced by entrepreneurs is a function of a global component and a country-specific component. 
E. Martial Etoundi Atenga, M. Hassan Abdo, and M. Mougoué                                                        American Business Review 24(2) 
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2 The main policy recommendation of market monetarism is that the Central Banks should set a level target of Nominal GDP 
to lessen economic shocks and guarantee the right tradeoff between inflation and real GDP growth. 
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Gertler and Karadi (2011) develop a quantitative DSGE with financial intermediaries that face 
balance sheet constraints. They aim to capture the depreciation of banks’ balance sheets and its 
effects on the economy. To accomplish this objective, the authors introduce a simple agency problem 
involving financial intermediaries and depositors. In this setting a bank can be affected by a disruption 
to the quality of its capital; this shock produces a decline in the net worth of the financial intermediary, 
thereby negatively affecting its activities. An immediate impact of the shock is a decrease in the value 
of the intermediary’s assets. As a result of its weakened balance sheet, the financial intermediary’s 
demand for assets lessens, leading to a decline in its market valuation. This reduction in asset prices 
shrinks the bank’s balance sheet further, thus affecting its ability to supply new loans even more. With 
this mechanism embedded into the framework, such a shock will affect the gross domestic product 
drastically. 
 
CREDIT MARKETS AND BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS 
 
The present paper tries to establish linkages between the financial and the real sectors showing how 
financial frictions impact business cycle fluctuations. The focus consists to frictions on the credit 
markets. Cycles allow borrowers to access credit. Credit cycles appear during periods when funds are 
easy to borrow; these periods are characterized by low interest rates, less stringent lending 
requirements, and more available credit.  
In advanced economies, a massive infusion of government funds and credit-easing policies aiming 
to fight a recession and improve bank balance sheets has not prevented the decrease in lending to the 
private sector during the global crisis (see, e.g., Puri et al. (2011) and Merilainen (2015)). Several factors 
explain why better financial conditions do not result in renewed growth in lending to the private sector 
in these economies. First, as economic conditions collapsed, the demand for credit decreased as GDP 
declined. Additionally, banks tightened lending rules because of greater uncertainty and weaker 
capital positions. The banks’ balance sheets still remain under strain, and funding conditions became 
tighter. In a different range, Hogan (2018) defends that the FED's interest on excess reserves policy 
differs from the standard interest rate floor framework, which influences banks' incentives to provide 
loans and reserves. They document that banks' loan and reserve assets are related to output growth 
but not to demand for credit or economic uncertainty. 
Philippon (2008) provides a theoretical framework in which the predictive content of corporate 
bond spreads for economic activity, without financial frictions, reflects a deterioration in economic 
fundamentals. The rise of credit spreads can also reflect disturbances in the credit supply coming from 
the deterioration of corporate balance sheets. In this vein, a contraction in credit supply brings asset 
values to collapse, increase risk defaults, and leads corporates spreads to widen before economic 
slowdown, as lenders claim compensation for the expected rise in defaults. By contrast, Gertler and 
Lown (1999) and Mody and Taylor (2004) document that yield spreads based on indexes of high-yield 
corporate bonds are well suited at forecasting output growth during the previous decade. More 
recently, Boivin et al. (2020) show that credit spread shocks significantly caused the deterioration in 
economic conditions during the December 2007 to June 2009 great recession. 
Market monetarism also argues that an important interaction exists between credit and economic 
fluctuations by assuming that monetary policy leads to monetary equilibrium and, therefore, to 
macroeconomic stability.2 The money supply, especially the credit supply is the main driver of business 
cycles fluctuations. The nominal GDP (NGDP) targeting (Sumner, 2012) or the productivity norm 
(Selgin, 1997) are the denomination of this monetary position. In contrast to an inflation targeting 
regime where the central bank mainly reacts to demand shocks, an NGDP-targeting regime holds that 
E. Martial Etoundi Atenga, M. Hassan Abdo, and M. Mougoué                                                        American Business Review 24(2) 
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3 The DSGE model is a combination of Smets and Wouters (SW) (2003, 2007) and Merola (2015), but we add a net worth 
shock. For an exhaustive description of the technical framework, we refer the reader to the original papers. 
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the monetary authority adjusts the money supply after both aggregate supply and aggregate demand 
shocks (Sumner, 2012). 
 
LINEARIZED DSGE MODEL 
 
The methodology used here is a DSGE model with real, nominal, and financial frictions.3 The anatomy 
is not complex. The economy is populated by a continuum of households and producers. Government 
and central bank implement the fiscal and the monetary policy, respectively. Households consume, 
accumulate capital and offer their work. Producers provide final goods and capital goods in the 
economy. The fiscal policy consists in government expenditures and the monetary policy is conducted 
according to the Taylor rule. In the following, we briefly describe the equations that characterize the 
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where t indexes time. Output (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡) is absorbed by consumption (𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡), investment (𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), costs that are a 
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state of government spending, 𝑔𝑔
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  is the steady-state of government spending-to-output ratio, 𝛾𝛾 is the 
steady-state growth rate, and 𝛿𝛿 is the depreciation rate of capital. The term 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 �𝑘𝑘
𝑦𝑦
� 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 measures the 
cost associated with the capital utilization, where 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘  is the steady-state of rental of capital, k is the 
steady-state of capital, and y is the steady-state of output. Therefore, 𝑘𝑘
𝑦𝑦
 is the capital coefficient. The 
term �𝑘𝑘
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� �𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡� measures bankruptcy costs, where 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 stands for capital 
services, r is the steady-state of the risk-free interest rate, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘  is the lagged value of capital stock, f is 
the steady-state of the external funding cost, and lev is the steady-state value of the leverage ratio 
(i.e., the ratio of capital to net worth in the corporate sector). The term suggests that the external 
funding cost increases the bankruptcy costs of debt while the rental of capital and the price of capital 
decrease the costs of financing with debt. More specifically, high costs of borrowing increase the 
probability of bankruptcy while a high rate of capital return reduces the risk of bankruptcy. 
Public spending follows a first-order autoregressive (AR (1)) process with an identically and 




𝑔𝑔 + 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔, with 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔~ℕ(0,1) and 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔~ℕ(0,1). 
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where the current consumption is given by (𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡), the parameter h captures the intensity of habit 
formation and introduces non-separability of preferences over time4, and 𝛾𝛾 is the steady-state growth 
rate. The operator 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 represents the expected value, 𝜎𝜎 represents the inverse of elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 represents inflation, and 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑙𝑙
𝑐𝑐
 is the steady-state of the ratio of labor 
income-to-consumption where 𝑤𝑤ℎ is the steady-state of wage, l the steady-state of labor services, and 
c the steady-state of consumption. Equation (2) also states that current consumption (𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) depends on 
a weighted average of past and expected future consumption and on expected growth in labor 
services (𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡+1), the ex-ante real interest rate (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1) , and a preference disturbance 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽 
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where 𝜑𝜑 is the steady-state elasticity of the capital adjustment cost function, and 𝛽𝛽 is the discount 
factor rate applied by households. The shock to the investment-specific technology process is 
assumed to follow an AR(1) as follows 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , with 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖~ℕ(0,1). 
The following equation corresponds to the intertemporal arbitrage for the value of capital: 
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where 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is the external cost of funding and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 is the rental cost of capital. Equation (4) shows that the 
current value of capital stock is positively linked to its expected future value and the expected real 
rental rate on capital, and negatively on the ex-ante cost of external funding. The term 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡−1𝑏𝑏 +
𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 with 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏~ℕ(0,1), represents the risk premium shock defined as an exogenous disruption to the 
external cost of financing. This shock assesses the wedge between the policy rate and the cost of 
external finance faced by entrepreneurs; therefore, it has similar effects as the net worth shock 
integrated in Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2010). 




FINANCIAL FRICTION IN THE BUSINESS SECTOR 
 
We extend the original SW (2007) DSGE model and introduce the presence of an agency problem that 
makes external funding more expensive than internal funding as in Merola (2015). We introduce 
financial frictions as in Bernanke et al. (1999), the demand for capital should fulfill the following 
condition, which shows that the real expected return on capital is equal to the real cost on external 
funds: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 = (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1) +𝜔𝜔�𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1�                                                                                         (5) 
 
where 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 represents the entrepreneur’s net worth and the parameter 𝜔𝜔 captures the elasticity of the 
external finance premium with respect to the leverage ratio.  
The EFP, 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, depends on the borrower’s leverage ratio and 𝜔𝜔 as follows: 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 − (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1) = 𝜔𝜔�𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1�                                                                             (6) 
 
The size of the EFP is related positively to leverage the conditions of entrepreneurial balance 
sheets. The presence of an EFP magnifies the effect of adverse shocks because it raises the cost of 
borrowing and worsens balance sheet conditions. 
To ensure that entrepreneurs’ net worth will never be enough to fully finance new capital 
acquisition, the model assumes that entrepreneurs have a limited lifespan and that the probability of 




𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1 = (𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙)𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 − 𝜔𝜔(𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 − 1)�𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡� − (𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 − 1)(𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡) + [𝜔𝜔(𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 − 1) + 1]𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 +
𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤                                                                                                                                                                             (7) 
 
where 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤  is a shock to the entrepreneurial net worth. The incorporation of this shock is an extension 
of the DSGE with financial frictions proposed by Merola (2015). This shock, defined as the unexpected 
gain or loss that affects the entrepreneur's balance sheet is given as: 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤 = 𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡−1
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤, with 
𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤~ℕ(0,1). In the EFP model Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) define the net worth shock as a decrease 
in the number of entrepreneurs that exit the model. Then, the net worth disturbance allows 




Turning to the production side, the output (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡) is produced using capital (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡) and labor services (𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) 
according to the following specification: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = Σ𝑝𝑝[𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔]                                                                                                                       (8) 
 
where 𝛼𝛼 represents the share of capital in production and Σ𝑝𝑝 captures fixed production costs. Shocks 
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CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
 
Current capital services (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡) depend on capital installed during the previous period �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝 � and the 
degree of capital utilization (𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡): 
 
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 = 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝 + 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡                                                                                                                                                       (9) 
 
The accumulation of installed capital �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝� depends on the investment expenditures and the 








𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝛾𝛾2𝜙𝜙𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                   (10) 
 





𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘                                                                                                                                                           (11) 
 
where 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘  determines the elasticity of utilization costs with respect to capital input. The capital rental 
rate, is derived by cost minimization: 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 = 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 + 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡                                                                                                                                                 (12) 
 
where (𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡) is real wage and the other variables are defined as earlier.  
 
PRICE AND WAGE SETTING 
 
The setting of price and wages follows a Calvo price-adjustment mechanism with partial indexation. 
Due to sticky prices and partial indexation, prices and wages adjust slowly to their desired markup. 
Under monopolistic competition, price markup �𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝� is defined as the difference between the marginal 
product of labor (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) and the real wage (𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡):  
 
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 − 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔                                                                                                  (13) 
 
Similarly, wage markup is given as the gap between the real wage, 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡  and the marginal rate of 
substitution between work and consumption, 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡:  
 







𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1�                                                                            (14) 
 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 is the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the real wage. Profit maximization by price-





�𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜄𝜄𝑝𝑝𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝� + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝                                                                                      (15) 
 
Equation (15) states that inflation (𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡) depends positively on past and expected inflation, 
negatively on the current price markup �𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝�, and positively on an inflation disturbance �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝�. The 
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𝑝𝑝 , with 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝~ℕ(0,1). The MA term describes the high-frequency movements 
of inflation. 𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 =
�1−𝜉𝜉𝑝𝑝��1−𝛽𝛽𝜉𝜉𝑝𝑝�
𝜉𝜉𝑝𝑝��Φ𝑝𝑝−1�𝜅𝜅𝑝𝑝+1�
 measures the speed of adjustment to the desired markup; it depends 
on the level of price stickiness �𝜉𝜉𝑝𝑝�, the degree of indexation to past inflation �𝜄𝜄𝑝𝑝�, the curvature of 
the Kimball (1995) goods market aggregator�𝜅𝜅𝑝𝑝�, and the steady-state markup, which, in equilibrium, 
is related to the share of fixed production costs �Φ𝑝𝑝� in a zero-profit condition.  





[𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜄𝜄𝑤𝑤𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1 − (1 + 𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝜄𝜄𝑤𝑤)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤] + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤                                        (16) 
 
Equation (16) states that real wage is a function of expected and past real wages; expected, 
current, and past inflation; the wage markup; and a wage disturbance (𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤). The wage disturbance is 
defined as 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 = 𝜌𝜌𝑝𝑝𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡−1𝑤𝑤 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤 − 𝜇𝜇𝑤𝑤𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡−1𝑤𝑤 , with 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤~ℕ(0,1). The MA component describes the high-
frequency fluctuations in wages. 𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘 =
(1−𝜉𝜉𝑤𝑤)(1−𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝜉𝜉𝑤𝑤)
𝜉𝜉𝑤𝑤[(Φ1−1)𝜅𝜅𝑤𝑤+1]
 represents the speed of adjustment to the 
expected wage markup. the degree of wage stickiness (𝜉𝜉𝑤𝑤), the degree of wage indexation (𝜄𝜄𝑤𝑤), and 
the demand elasticity for labor, which is a function of the steady-state labor market markup 




Finally, the central bank follows a generalized Taylor rule in setting the interest rate on the short run 
(𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡) in response to the lagged interest rate, current inflation, the current level of the output gap, 
changes in the current level of the output and the output gap, and an exogenous innovation term that 
is assumed to follow an AR(1) process. The monetary policy rule can be written as follows:  
 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟∗𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝜌𝜋𝜋(1 − 𝜌𝜌)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 + 𝜌𝜌𝑦𝑦 ∗ (1 − 𝜌𝜌)�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝� + 𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦�(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1)− �𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1
𝑝𝑝 ��+
𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟                                                                                                                                                                         (17) 
 
where 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 = 𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡−1𝑟𝑟 + 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟, with 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟~ℕ(0,1) 
To obtain the original model without financial frictions, it is sufficient to set the elasticity of the EFP 
with respect to the leverage ratio as 𝜔𝜔 = 0 and the steady-state of the leverage ratio as 𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 = 1. 
Moreover, it is important to note that, unlike the standard DSGE model without financial frictions, the 
DSGE model with a financial accelerator mechanism incorporates the spread shock and the net worth 
shock.  
 
DATA AND PRIORS 
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS 
 
Our sample data covers the U.S., the U.K., Canada, and the Euro Area. We include the U.K. and the U.S. 
since they have the highest financial systems in the world. Therefore, we expect they are the most 
sensitive to financial crises. The Eurozone was included in order to examine the role of the European 
debt crisis in driving economic fluctuations. Finally, the Canada’s financial system was highly resilient 
during the recent global financial crisis. It is interesting to make a comparative analysis of its business 
activity during crises with other advanced economies.
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The system’s stochastic behavior is governed by nine exogenous structural shocks in the theoretic 
financial frictions model: two technology shocks, one for changes in productivity (𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔) and the other 
for the marginal efficiency of investment �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�; one shock for consumption preferences �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽�; one 
shock to government expenditure �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔�; one shock to monetary policy (𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟); and two markup shocks, 
one for inflation determination �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝�, and another for wage setting (𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤). The financial frictions model 
introduces two additional shocks for the external cost of funding �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏�, and the entrepreneur net 
worth �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤�. The stochastic structure of the exogenous variables evolves according to AR(1) 
processes. 
To identify these shocks, the models estimated with Bayesian techniques use nine quarterly key 
macroeconomic time series as observable variables. Specifically, the logarithm (log) difference of real 
GDP (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡), log of real consumption (𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡), log of real investment (𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), log of GDP deflator (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡), log real 
wages (𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡), log of the total employment level (𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡), the nominal interest rate, the external finance 
premium (𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡), and net worth (𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡). 
The external finance premium was proxied by Bank of America (BofA) ML corporates BBB-AAA 
rated (C0A4-C0A1 for the U.S, UR40-UR10 for the U.K, F0C4-F0C1 for Canada and ER40-ER10 for the 
Euro Area). Similarly, the net worth of entrepreneurs in each country is proxied by the value of the 
stock market price index as in Alpanda and Aysun (2014) and Doojav and Kalirajan (2019) (S&P 500 for 
the U.S., FTSE 100 for the U.K., SP/TSX for Canada and Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 Price Index for the 
Eurozone). The remaining data series are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database, 
the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund and Bloomberg. Appendix A 
contains further information regarding the data.5 























































































                                                               (18) 
 
In the model without financial frictions, the spread and the entrepreneur net worth are not 




The Bayesian method utilized in this study has two main advantages. First, the system of linearized 
equations is estimated simultaneously. Second, Bayesian analysis allows the incorporation of 
uncertainty and prior information regarding the model’s parameterization. However, it should be 
noted that the choice of the priors is of utmost importance because it might affect the estimates 
significantly.  More  exactly,  the  calibration  of  priors  has  a  significant  effect  on  the  estimates  of 
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posteriors using a Bayesian estimation strategy. The main goal of this study is to make a comparative 
analysis of the effects of financial frictions during financial crises. Different priors across countries can 
lead to a bias in the posterior estimates. To make useful comparisons among countries, priors are 
assumed to be the same for all the countries. Because the main objective of our research was to 
examine the role of frictions on financial markets, we assume that the chosen economies are 
symmetric. All prior distributions were selected from the normal, beta, gamma and inverse gamma 
distributions depending on the specific characteristics of the parameters.6 
All prior distributions are taken directly from Smets and Wouters (2007) and Merola (2015). More 
specifically, the parameters dealing with the model without financial frictions are extracted from 
Smets and Wouters (2007) whereas the parameters related to financial frictions are specified as in 
Merola (2015). 
The AR(1) and MA(1) coefficients and the correlation coefficient between output and government 
spending follow a beta distribution with mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.2. The priors for the 
standard errors of the shocks follow an inverse gamma with mean of 0.2 and standard deviation of 
0.2. The distribution of the structural parameters from the original SW model is consistent with the 
SW model priors. Parameters for inflation, output level, and output variation are normally distributed 
with means of 1.5, 0.125 and 0.125 and standard deviations of 0.25, 0.05, and 0.05, respectively. The 
interest rate smoothing parameter follows a beta distribution with mean of 0.75. 
Looking to the model that introduces financial frictions, we set the prior for the elasticity of the 
entrepreneur external finance premium with respect to the entrepreneur leverage   as a gaussian 
distribution with mean of 0.05 and standard deviation of 0.02. The steady-state of the leverage ratio 




This section presents the forecast error variance decompositions for real variables (output, 
consumption, investment, nominal interest rates, inflation, wage, and labor) and financial variables 
(corporate bond spread and net worth) for Canada, Euro Area, U.K., and U.S. Variance decomposition 
is employed to understand the main forces driving economic fluctuations during the recent 2007/2008 
global financial crisis as well as the 2009 European sovereign debt crisis. Tables 1-4 show the forecast 
error variance decomposition of the financial and non-financial variables attributed to the nine shocks 
identified earlier in the paper. On the whole, the variance decomposition confirmed that during the 
global financial crisis, disturbances triggered by the financial variables have replaced the role of 
traditional shocks in driving macroeconomic fluctuations. 
The DSGE results show that the output is mainly driven by real shocks for models without and with 
financial frictions in selected economies before the onset of recent financial crises. The contribution 
of real shocks tends to decrease during financial crises when financial frictions are entered into the 
model for the Euro Area while the role of real shocks remains important in Canada and the United 
States. The productivity and wage shocks are the main drivers of consumption variation in the Euro 
Area and the United States. During periods of relative stability, inflation shock is the main driver of 
consumption variation in Canada while government expenditure shock is the main driver of 
consumption variation in the U.K. The risk premium shock produced a significant consumption 
variation in these economies during the recent financial crises. Finally, our results show that the recent 
financial crises significantly reduced the impact of real shocks on investment variation in all the 
economies sampled. 
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In the sake of brevity, the following discussion focuses on variance decomposition for output, 







The DSGE estimates suggest that the output is mainly driven by real shocks, especially productivity 
shock in Canada. This finding is consistent with the neoclassical theory of real business cycles and 
confirms the resilience of the Canadian economy to financial disturbances.8 
The contribution of the productivity shock in explaining output variation is 17.21 percent in the 
model with financial friction (Panel A, Table 1). The predominance of the productivity shock in 
explaining output variation relies on the commodity dependency of the Canadian economic activity. 
We can also note that the joint contribution of real shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤� to 
output fluctuation is 83.11 percent during the pre-crisis period (Panel A, Table 1) while the financial 
shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� jointly contribute 16.89 percent to output volatility. During the crisis period, the 
joint effect of real shocks on output variation rises to 98.66 percent while the contribution of financial 
variables drops to as low as 1.34 percent. Overall, these results imply that the role of real shocks in 



























Table 1. Variance Decomposition, Model with Financial Frictions –Canada–Variance Decomposition is 
Computed for Different Periods (Pre-Crisis, Crisis), and Different Crises (Global Financial Crisis and 
European Debt Crisis) 
    𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒂 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒃𝒃 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒃𝒃 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕
𝒈𝒈















Output 17.21 4.22 6.75 16.07 9.85 6.77 15.01 13.98 10.14 
Consumption 3.42 5.58 24.71 11.15 20.91 4.15 5.11 6.87 18.10 
Investment 0.01 0.34 27.73 0.21 29.41 1.56 2.54 11.63 26.57 
Interest Rate 0.15 1.31 14.06 0.82 29.95 2.25 2.33 21.88 27.26 
Inflation 0.04 0.45 3.80 0.42 14.08 0.26 25.63 41.57 13.75 
Wage 1.24 0.67 3.664 0.46 2.22 0.59 34.19 55.34 1.65 
Labor 0.46 0.32 11.77 0.88 22.10 2.55 5.27 36.07 20.56 
Corporate 
Spread 0.02 0.05 7.03 0.06 43.27 0.27 1.14 15.94 32.23 












Output 38.17 2.37 0.39 8.92 2.22 2.51 32.39 12.07 0.95 
Consumption 2.71 5.93 5.74 20.17 13.16 3.53 32.84 13.05 2.87 
Investment 0.07 0.17 13.39 0.03 41.44 0.81 21.09 12.88 10.11 
Interest Rate 0.04 0.60 0.73 0.25 4.15 0.70 68.33 24.14 1.06 
Inflation 0.05 0.17 0.22 0.02 1.81 0.25 67.94 29.06 0.48 
Wage 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.93 0.88 0.31 69.14 26.83 0.14 
Labor 0.04 0.32 0.48 0.24 2.05 0.44 74.96 20.83 0.64 
Corporate 
Spread 0.03 0.06 4.72 0.01 18.31 0.03 35.60 18.75 22.50 












Output 0.72 0.02 2.84 0.01 0.00 2.04 86.44 0.02 7.90 
Consumption 0.14 0.11 0.63 0.00 0.00 2.40 81.12 0.05 15.54 
Investment 0.02 0.00 7.51 0.00 0.00 1.30 52.30 0.01 38.85 
Interest Rate 0.12 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 1.77 72.71 0.04 24.58 
Inflation 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.71 93.67 0.02 4.40 
Wage 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.27 99.41 0.03 0.23 
Labor 0.07 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.71 84.20 0.06 14.17 
Corporate 
Spread 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.18 20.04 0.01 78.80 










Output 28.33 0.92 1.88 18.09 2.74 4.25 0.40 10.91 32.48 
Consumption 1.27 1.40 2.82 8.04 9.37 2.45 0.19 11.11 63.34 
Investment 0.00 0.22 3.92 0.41 9.46 1.76 0.01 8.46 75.75 
Interest Rate 0.03 0.58 0.81 1.08 3.78 2.89 0.04 36.50 54.29 
Inflation 0.04 0.47 0.61 0.97 1.20 0.38 1..27 59.29 35.76 
Wage 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.18 0.76 0.16 1.27 94.39 2.91 
Labor 0.06 0.09 0.55 0.96 3.64 1.71 0.02 28.69 64.27 
Corporate 
Spread 0.00 0.04 0.75 0.10 4.91 0.30 0.00 25.04 68.85 
Net Worth 0.00 0.18 87.74 0.36 0.85 1.37 0.06 6.18 3.26 
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9 Whereas the dominant determinant of consumption variability during the pre-crisis period in the model without financial 
friction is the inflation shock (29.50 percent). 
10 In the model without financial friction, inflation shock accounts for 44.82 percent of consumption volatility during the crisis 
period and 29.50 percent at the peak of the financial crisis. 
11 Investment variability in Canada appears to be driven mostly by government expenditure shock in the model without 





During the pre-crisis period the risk premium shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏� is the most relevant with an impact of 24.71 
percent (Panel A, Table 1).9 However, during the crisis period (Panel B, Table 1) as well as at the peak 
of the financial crisis from 2008:Q1 to 2009:Q3 (Panel C, Table 1), the inflation shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝� is an 
important driver of consumption volatility. The inflation shock explains 32.84 percent of consumption 
variation during the 2000Q1 to 2014Q4 entire sample period (Panel B, Table 1) and 81.12 percent during 
the peak of the financial crisis from 2008Q1 to 2009Q3 (Panel C, Table 1).10 It is worth noting that the 
contribution of financial shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� to consumption variability declines from 42.81 percent 
during the pre-crisis period (Panel A, Table 1) to only 8.61 percent during the crisis period. At the peak 
of the financial crisis, however, this decline was only 16.17 percent. During the European debt crisis, 
however, financial shocks regained tremendous importance in explaining consumption volatility, 




The investment generally depends on financial market conditions and investment shock.11 During the 
pre-crisis period, investment shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� is the dominant driver of investment volatility (Panel A, Table 
1). Interestingly, the role of financial shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� in explaining investment variability drops from 
54.30 percent during the pre-crisis period (Panel A, Table 1) to 23.50 percent during the crisis period 
(Panel B, Table 1). At the peak of the financial crisis, however, financial shocks regained importance by 
explaining as much as 46.36 percent of investment volatility. These empirical estimates reveal that real 
shocks from the demand side are significant to stimulate investment in Canada during stability periods. 





During the pre-crisis period and crisis period, real shocks collectively accounted for 60.74 percent and 
72.78 percent, respectively, of corporate bond spread volatility (Panels A and B, Table 1). Our results 
also show that the contribution of the risk premium shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏� equal to 75.95 percent (Panel A, Table 
1) is the most important determinant of the entrepreneurs’ net worth volatility during the pre-crisis 
period, declining to 67.68 percent during the crisis period (Panel B, Table 1) with net worth shock 
gaining importance. At the peak of the financial crisis and during the European debt crisis, however, 
net worth shock was by far the most important driver of financial corporate spread volatility (Panels 
C and D, Table 1). In August 2011, for example, the Toronto Stock Exchange lost 435.90 points. This was 
due in part to fears of contagion of the European sovereign debt crisis to Spain and Italy, as well as 
concerns over the possible worsening of France’s current AAA rating and the prospect of sluggish 
economic growth in the U.S. 
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12 The role played by productivity shock in driving output fluctuations during the European debt crisis in the model without 
financial friction was more important than in the model with financial friction. In the model without financial friction, 







The occurrence of financial frictions considerably reduces the relevance of real shocks in driving 
output fluctuations in the Euro Area.12 The share of productivity shock in explaining output fluctuation 
dips to 1.96 percent (Panel D, Table 2) whereas net worth shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� explains as much as 61.08 
percent of output fluctuation. Furthermore, the contribution of the risk premium shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏� accounts 
for another 5.80 percent of output variability. In fact, the joint contribution of real shocks 
�𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤� to output fluctuation is 33.12 percent whereas the financial 
shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� jointly contribute 66.88 percent to output volatility. This result stands in sharp 
contrast to the pre-crisis period finding which reveals that the joint effect of real shocks on output 
variation was 68.53 percent (Panel A, Table 2). Taken together, this finding implies that the role of real 
shocks in explaining output variation during the European debt crisis was clearly supplanted by 
financial shocks. Indeed, during the European debt crisis, the net worth shock had a significantly 





























Table 2. Variance Decomposition, Model with Financial Frictions –Euro Area–Variance Decomposition 
is Computed for Different Periods (Pre-Crisis, Crisis), and Different Crises (Global Financial Crisis and 
European Debt Crisis) 
    𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒂 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒃𝒃 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒃𝒃 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕
𝒈𝒈















Output 24.72 7.81 8.04 4.81 17.42 12.87 0.59 0.31 23.43 
Consumption 28.77 20.50 1.52 1.70 8.96 22.54 1.68 1.63 12.70 
Investment 4.30 4.03 14.90 0.36 25.61 3.55 0.01 0.06 47.17 
Interest rate 6.05 14.52 2.30 0.71 43.96 16.44 0.00 2.09 13.93 
Inflation 8.69 18.52 2.63 1.01 39.33 15.34 1.26 2.56 10.66 
Wage 7.67 4.70 0.56 0.14 11.95 8.76 13.30 43.49 9.43 
Labor 0.86 2.92 1.92 0.12 61.09 3.72 0.02 0.52 28.83 
Corp. spread 0.19 1.02 3.24 0.03 30.14 0.53 0.00 0.11 64.74 












Output 48.72 3.33 15.21 2.93 14.56 5.23 1.24 0.13 8.66 
Consumption 28.58 7.94 26.75 2.06 15.11 5.71 1.40 1.07 11.38 
Investment 0.04 1.05 48.73 0.00 28.02 0.10 0.01 0.17 21.88 
Interest rate 0.03 89.57 1.18 0.02 0.50 3.34 4.46 4.46 0.41 
Inflation 0.06 46.66 0.16 0.00 0.49 0.15 22.52 0.10 0.25 
Wage 4.88 3.55 0.59 0.01 3.52 1.30 77.71 0.01 0.94 
Labor 26.05 3.96 18.25 0.20 32.16 1.28 4.01 0.50 13.96 
Corp. spread 0.04 2.99 29.81 0.00 32.23 0.01 0.09 0.04 34.83 










Output 25.55 21.39 1.07 0.28 0.02 1.61 0.00 0.15 49.93 
Consumption 9.33 71.41 0.96 0.06 0.01 0.98 0.00 0.03 17.22 
Investment 15.01 35.60 0.76 0.05 0.01 0.64 0.00 0.00 47.93 
Interest rate 6.02 60.44 0.83 0.12 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.00 32.33 
Inflation 7.70 65.19 0.82 0.13 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.00 25.80 
Wage 13.40 36.05 0.86 0.07 0.01 2.77 0.18 14.85 31.81 
Labor 1.39 26.17 0.60 0.06 0.01 1.28 0.00 0.00 70.49 
Corp. spread 1.16 20.17 0.72 0.04 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.00 77.41 










Output 1.96 7.12 5.80 4.01 8.38 9.06 1.64 0.95 61.08 
Consumption 13.80 6.35 0.14 1.17 0.64 10.11 30.55 26.69 10.55 
Investment 0.05 4.54 7.62 0.59 11.46 5.50 3.03 5.16 62.04 
Interest rate 1.50 2.58 1.01 0.37 9.56 13.94 8.28 17.36 45.41 
Inflation 0.81 5.27 1.14 0.76 6.82 13.86 12.51 21.53 37.30 
Wage 4.67 1.74 0.12 0.28 0.69 1.75 34.89 48.07 7.78 
Labor 10.71 5.06 1.97 0.69 12.94 5.53 1.48 2.74 58.88 
Corp. spread 0.38 1.27 3.34 0.17 20.96 3.21 13.38 9.14 48.15 
Net worth 0.02 0.73 80.85 0.09 4.80 1.25 1.45 1.48 9.32 
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13 In the model without financial friction, the productivity shock is more prominent during the crisis period (69.22 percent) 
compared to the pre-crisis period (61.98 percent). However, at the peak of the financial crisis from 2008:Q1 to 2009:Q3, the 
wage shock supplanted productivity shock in explaining consumption variability (80.15 percent; =13.77 percent). 





The most important determinant of consumption variability before the financial crisis is productivity 
shock.13 A major component of the variation in consumption is explained by the consumption 
preference shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝛽𝛽�, especially at the peak of the financial crisis. Another interesting finding is that 
financial shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� together account for 14.22 percent of consumption variability while real 
shocks jointly account for as much as 85.78 percent of the variability in consumption (Panel A, Table 
2) during the pre-crisis period, declining to only 61.87 percent during the crisis period (Panel B, Table 
2). Finally, it is worth noting that while the combined role of financial shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� in explaining 
consumption variability increases at the peak of the financial crisis to 18.18 percent (Panel B, Table 2), 
their contribution decreases significantly to only 10.69 percent during the European debt crisis (Panel 
D, Table 2). This may be due to the fact that more wealth may have been destroyed at the peak of the 




The investment level depends on financial market conditions and investment shock.14 The role of this 
shock in driving investment fluctuations is significantly reduced when the financial accelerator 
mechanism become operative. The decrease of the role of investment specific shock in explaining 
investment decisions can be explained by the fact that entrepreneur’s net worth shock generates 
counterfactual effect on asset prices. and the empirical estimates show that financial disturbances 
(risk premium and net worth) are accorded a substantial role in determining investment variability 
during the 2008 crisis period. Our empirical estimates suggest that non-financial corporations in the 
Euro Area significantly adjust their business investments to risk premium shock, especially during 
financial crises. During the pre-crisis period, the risk premium shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏�  explained about 14.90 
percent of investment variability (Panel A, Table 2). This percentage jumped to 48.73 percent during 
the crisis period (Panel B, Table 2). Our result also shows that financial shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� jointly 
explained 62.07 percent of investment variability during the pre-crisis period (Panel A, Table 2), 
jumping to an impressive 70.61 percent during the crisis period (Panel B, Table 2) and to 69.66 percent 
during the European debt crisis. These results are generally consistent with Barkbu et al. (2015) who 
suggest that the weakness of investment in the Eurozone during the financial crisis was explained by 




Movements on financial markets are not related to the dynamics of the real sector. Financial shocks 
�𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� explains a large part of the forecast error variance of financial series (corporate spread and 
net worth). Specifically, financial shocks explained 67.98 percent of corporate spread fluctuation 
during the pre-crisis period (Panel A, Table 2), declining moderately to 64.64 percent during the crisis 
period (Panel B, Table 2) and rising as high as 78.13 percent at the peak of the crisis (Panel C, Table 2).




Finally, we note that the contribution of financial shocks to corporate spread volatility stagnates at 
51.49 percent during the European debt crisis (Panel D, Table 2). Financial shocks explained as much 
as 88.25 percent of the entrepreneurs’ net worth volatility during the pre-crisis period (Panel A, Table 
2), declining to 75.65 percent during the crisis period (Panel B, Table 2). Of all the seven real variables 
we analyze, only investment shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� appears to be a significant driver for both the corporate spread 
and net worth during the pre-crisis (30.14 percent and 10.40 percent, respectively, Panel A, Table 2). 
However, the impact of investment shock on the corporate spread and net worth became more 






The dominant forces behind output developments in the U.K. during the pre-crisis period in both 
models are government expenditures and inflation shocks ��𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔� and �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝�� (Panel A, Table 3). This 
suggests that the economic activity mainly relies on public spending decisions and inflationary 
pressures when economic outlook is stable in the United Kingdom. However, during the crisis period, 
productivity shock (𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔) in both models becomes the most important driver of output variability. This 
is consistent with the IMF (2014) which shows that during the 2008 crisis the collapse in the U.K. GDP 
was largely due to a sharp decline in total factor productivity and, to a lesser extent, reduced labor 
inputs as well as slower capital accumulation. Moreover, the monetary shock is the most important 
factor driving output variation at the peak of the crisis (91.67 percent, Panel C, Table 3) and during the 
European debt crisis (26.05 percent, Panel D, Table 3). Indeed, U.K. monetary policy was significantly 
expansionary, with the Bank Rate reduced from 5.75% in late 2007 to 0.5% in early 2009 in order to 
support U.K. output and control inflation during the global financial crisis. After reaching the effective 
lower bound for interest rates, the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) began a series 
of asset purchases, often referred to as quantitative easing, in a further attempt to stimulate U.K. 
economic activity. As the Euro Area crisis intensified from the late 2011, MPC took further measures to 
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15 The most important determinant of consumption variability during the pre-crisis period in the model without financial 
friction is government expenditure shock. 
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Table 3. Variance Decomposition, Model with Financial Frictions –U.K.–Variance Decomposition is 
Computed for Different Periods (Pre-Crisis, Crisis), and Different Crises (Global Financial Crisis and 
European Debt Crisis) 
    𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒂 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒃𝒃 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒃𝒃 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕
𝒈𝒈












Output 9.82 9.32 13.03 19.05 15.03 9.16 18.57 0.78 4.34 
Consumption 2.20 9.06 23.82 15.79 23.40 6.79 12.89 0.46 5.58 
Investment 0.00 0.03 43.07 0.00 45.34 0.12 0.14 0.02 11.28 
Interest rate 0.08 9.43 21.75 1.28 27.62 6.97 14.90 6.87 11.10 
Inflation 0.13 1.08 5.04 0.25 7.58 1.58 73.08 7.88 3.37 
Wage 0.56 0.89 0.92 0.09 1.26 1.04 44.95 49.98 0.31 
Labor 0.23 2.00 32.45 1.58 40.55 3.19 4.72 1.59 13.70 
Corp. spread 0.00 0.01 43.65 0.00 26.50 0.00 0.03 0.06 29.75 









Output 42.59 20.79 1.17 19.21 2.22 11.21 1.39 0.14 1.28 
Consumption 11.76 29.37 11.21 21.18 9.43 11.46 1.34 0.25 3.99 
Investment 0.03 0.14 40.01 0.01 40.44 1.10 0.05 0.03 18.20 
Interest rate 2.25 18.46 18.37 2.83 16.69 28.44 1.70 3.93 7.33 
Inflation 0.07 0.57 0.65 0.00 0.95 1.77 87.96 7.47 0.55 
Wage 0.60 0.87 0.96 0.14 1.10 0.54 30.47 64.85 0.46 
Labor 1.83 33.53 14.60 2.53 13.90 24.39 0.95 4.02 4.25 
Corp. spread 0.01 0.01 41.36 0.00 23.35 0.42 0.02 9.17 34.61 









Output 0.18 0.11 0.01 3.44 2.17 91.67 0.06 0.06 2.30 
Consumption 0.02 0.38 0.00 0.17 0.21 98.63 0.15 0.03 0.41 
Investment 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.12 11.18 68.42 0.06 0.00 20.01 
Interest rate 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.10 3.01 88.53 0.08 0.01 8.15 
Inflation 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.66 97.47 0.18 0.02 1.55 
Wage 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.65 88.11 0.41 10.34 0.37 
Labor 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.20 2.62 89.82 0.08 0.01 7.19 
Corp. spread 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.08 8.65 49.19 0.54 0.02 41.41 










Output 11.12 0.53 0.85 22.66 9.28 26.05 5.06 10.92 13.53 
Consumption 3.82 0.43 0.60 5.55 9.04 16.54 4.29 29.47 30.46 
Investment 0.39 0.97 1.80 0.02 22.38 22.51 0.17 1.49 50.27 
Interest rate 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.03 60.70 0.06 38.21 0.67 
Inflation 0.38 0.52 0.00 0.02 0.09 31.75 20.03 46.54 0.68 
Wage 1.19 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.16 1.75 39.51 56.20 1.15 
Labor 0.15 0.80 0.18 0.72 4.80 23.75 0.49 32.62 36.50 
Corp. spread 0.02 0.68 0.53 0.01 8.52 13.52 0.10 21.32 55.30 
Net worth 0.08 0.62 63.51 0.01 3.23 13.33 0.65 4.57 14.00 




The risk premium shock is the most important determinant of consumption variation15 with an impact 
of 23.82 percent (Panel A, Table 3). A major component of the variation in consumption is explained 
by the consumption preference shock, especially during the crisis period (Panel B, Table 3). However,
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16 However, the contribution of investment shock to investment variability is more pronounced in the model without financial 
friction (64.32 percent) compared to the model with financial friction (45.34, Panel A Table 3). 
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at the peak of the financial crisis from 2008:Q1 to 2009:Q3, the monetary policy shock (𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟) outpaces 
risk premium shock by explaining as much as 98.63 percent of consumption variability (Panel C, Table 
3). The large expansionary monetary policy adopted by the central bank stimulate households to 
borrow to finance their private consumption. Another interesting finding is that financial shocks 
�𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� jointly account for 29.40 percent of consumption variability while real shocks jointly 
account for as much as 70.60 percent of the variability in consumption (Panel A, Table 3) during the 
pre-crisis period, increasing to 84.80 percent during the crisis period (Panel B, Table 3). Finally, it is 
worth noting that the combined role of financial shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� in explaining consumption 
variability decreases dramatically to 0.41 percent during the peak of the financial crisis (Panel C, Table 
3) but regains relative importance during the European debt crisis by explaining as much as 31.01 




During the pre-crisis period, investment shock is the most important determinant of investment 
variability.16 During the pre-crisis period, financial shocks account for 54.35 percent investment 
variability (Panel A, Table 3) increasing to 58.29 percent during the crisis period (Panel B, Table 3). This 
is consistent with Akbar et al. (2013) who examine how shocks to the supply of credit during the global 
financial crisis affected British companies. Their findings suggest that credit contraction has negatively 
affected the performance and investment of private firms. We note, however, that monetary policy 
shock supplants financial shocks in explaining investment volatility at the peak of the financial crisis 
(68.42 percent, Panel C, Table 3). Interestingly, financial shocks regain great importance in explaining 




Financial shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� explain a large part of the forecast error variance of financial variables 
(corporate spread and net worth). Precisely, financial shocks explain 73.40 percent of corporate 
spread fluctuation during the pre-crisis period (Panel A, Table 3), rising to 75.97 percent during the 
crisis period (Panel B, Table 3) and decreasing to as low as 41.44 percent at the peak of the crisis (Panel 
C, Table 3) seemingly replaced with monetary policy shock which now explain as much as 49.19 percent 
of corporate spread variability (Panel C, Table 3). This can be explained by the fact that low interest 
rates resulting from the massive expansionary monetary policy adopted by the U.K. central bank has 
significantly contributed to reduce the external finance premium. Furthermore, we note that financial 
shocks explain as much as 77.98 percent of the entrepreneurs’ net worth volatility during the pre-crisis 
period (Panel A, Table 3), increasing to 80.64 percent during the crisis period (Panel B, Table 3). 
However, monetary policy shock largely determines entrepreneurs’ net worth volatility at the peak of 
the 2008 financial crisis (79.21 percent, Panel C, Table 3). Finally, it can be seen that financial shocks 
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17 The joint contribution is 46.44 percent in the model without financial friction. 







Inflation and wage shocks ��𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝� , (𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤)� are the main drivers of output variation during the pre-crisis 
period in the U.S. The joint contribution of these two shocks to output variation is 42.50 percent17 
(Panel A, Table 4). During the crisis period, however, productivity shock (𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔) becomes the main driver 
of output fluctuation in both models (Panel B, Table 4). In fact, productivity shock alone accounts for 
56.80 percent in the model with financial friction.18 These results reveal that when the economic 
activity is stable in the U.S., firms adjust their production regarding the private earnings of households 
and their power purchase which mirror the demand that they face. During an economic crisis period, 
non-financial companies limit their production so that the productivity shock is the main driver of 
output fluctuations. However, the presence of financial friction clearly dampens the impact of real 


































Table 4. Variance Decomposition, Model with Financial Frictions –U.K.–Variance Decomposition is 
Computed for Different Periods (Pre-Crisis, Crisis), and Different Crises (Global Financial Crisis and 
European Debt Crisis) 
    𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒂 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒃𝒃 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕𝒃𝒃 𝒙𝒙𝒕𝒕
𝒈𝒈













Output 9.34 4.19 5.04 10.19 7.00 15.56 19.36 23.14 6.19 
Consumption 5.92 12.51 1.01 0.41 6.24 14.32 8.23 43.44 7.94 
Investment 0.47 0.11 14.98 0.00 29.97 6.26 15.22 2.78 30.21 
Interest rate 0.95 1.68 0.23 0.01 3.77 4.80 20.31 62.42 5.83 
Inflation 0.60 0.40 0.07 0.00 1.41 12.61 34.12 48.53 2.26 
Wage 3.18 1.15 0.13 0.00 1.34 5.34 77.41 9.95 1.50 
Labor 0.62 0.19 0.27 0.09 1.88 2.01 6.97 85.15 2.83 
Corp. spread 0.04 0.00 0.95 0.00 2.31 0.59 0.24 2.95 92.93 













Output 56.80 12.07 0.93 11.92 1.39 11.31 0.89 1.95 2.74 
Consumption 30.62 17.75 5.82 10.12 10.94 9.74 0.51 5.90 8.60 
Investment 0.15 0.26 22.67 0.01 36.57 3.94 0.53 1.42 34.46 
Interest rate 4.61 6.60 3.66 0.53 15.18 30.17 5.59 22.87 10.80 
Inflation 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.03 58.92 39.67 0.77 
Wage 1.83 1.29 0.83 0.18 4.52 0.65 15.62 71.04 4.06 
Labor 3.27 12.00 1.83 0.80 15.14 12.09 1.90 46.19 6.79 
Corp. spread 0.06 0.04 4.25 0.00 9.99 0.10 0.08 1.92 83.56 













Output 28.65 7.04 3.62 6.48 1.35 52.82 0.00 0.03 0.01 
Consumption 17.79 17.15 1.51 2.66 1.67 59.07 0.01 0.14 0.00 
Investment 26.54 17.21 5.52 4.33 2.07 44.30 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Interest rate 14.17 22.04 8.68 6.41 5.06 43.62 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Inflation 12.53 17.07 5.97 4.93 2.91 56.55 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Wage 60.17 3.14 0.77 1.25 1.05 31.85 0.39 1.37 0.00 
Labor 7.68 11.69 4.80 3.43 2.39 69.95 0.00 0.04 0.02 
Corp. spread 5.41 14.34 10.73 4.16 11.61 53.69 0.00 0.01 0.05 










Output 3.35 0.76 4.77 11.38 56.65 0.29 0.05 17.47 5.27 
Consumption 1.58 5.07 0.28 1.44 89.08 0.68 0.08 1.14 0.64 
Investment 0.66 1.46 0.30 20.87 33.13 0.07 0.00 32.16 11.35 
Interest rate 5.01 5.56 1.21 7.43 45.14 0.17 0.04 18.48 16.96 
Inflation 2.42 3.10 0.67 2.10 77.81 3.08 0.11 6.75 3.95 
Wage 1.52 0.24 0.07 1.20 21.96 36.64 35.58 0.88 1.91 
Labor 1.43 1.06 0.38 5.15 71.53 0.13 0.03 8.55 11.74 
Corp. spread 0.3 0.42 0.09 8.09 15.65 0.26 0.04 28.12 47.01 
Net worth 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.58 3.49 0.00 0.00 94.41 1.28 




In the U.S., wage shock (𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤) is the dominant driver of consumption fluctuation during the pre-crisis 
period. The mean impact of wage shock on consumption is 42.41 percent (Panel A, Table 4). This is 
intuitive and consistent with Stephens (2001), who shows that households are able to smooth their 
consumption in response to earnings shocks. Stephens also finds that large changes in earnings result




in small changes in household consumption in the short run. In the long run, however, he documents 
that household consumption is still affected significantly but not to the same magnitude as earnings. 
During the crisis period, productivity shock becomes the predominant determinant of consumption 
variability, accounting for 30.62 percent of consumption variation (Panel B, Table 4). The risk premium 
shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏� had no information content to forecast the consumption error-variance during the pre-
crisis period (1.01 percent, Panel A, Table 4). This confirms Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2009) results who 
found that corporate credit spreads have essentially no information content for future consumption 
spending on both durable and non-durable goods from 1990:Q2 to 2008:Q2. The combined effect of 
financial shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� grew from 8.95 percent during the pre-crisis period (Panel A, Table 4) to 
14.42 percent during the crisis period. However, at the peak of the financial crisis from 2008:Q1 to 
2009:Q3, the monetary policy shock (𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟) became the most important driver of consumption 
explaining as much as 59.07 percent of consumption variation. Finally, it is worth noting that 
investment shock �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� became the most important driver of consumption variation, explaining about 




During the pre-crisis period, investment shock is a significant driver of investment variation. Financial 
shocks also play a relevant role in the U.S. investment fluctuations. During the pre-crisis period, it 
explained 14.98 percent of investment variation (Panel A, Table 4b) growing to 22.67 percent during 
the crisis period (Panel B, Table 4). This result reveals that linkages between credit markets frictions 
and the real sector strengthens during the crisis period and is in line with Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2009) 
who find that high-yield bond spread can be used to forecast total investment spending. The combined 
financial shocks �𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤� account for 45.19 percent of the forecast error-variance of investment 
(Panel A, Table 4) during the pre-crisis period, increasing to 57.13 percent during the crisis period (Panel 
B, Table4). However, we observe that movements in business investment at the peak of the financial 
crisis are primarily driven by the monetary policy shock, productivity shock, and consumption shock 
which explained, respectively, 44.30 percent, 26.54 percent, and 17.21 percent of investment variability 
(Panel C, table 4). The high contribution of the monetary policy shock is consistent with the massive 




The dynamics on assets and credit markets is disconnected to the real sector when there is a tranquility 
in the economy. However, it seems that central bank decisions are able to reduce the stress on 
financial markets in the U.S. during a great turmoil. The DSGE estimates show that the forecast error 
variance of financial variables is largely explained by risk premium and net worth shocks. Specifically, 
these financial shocks together explain 93.88 percent of corporate spread fluctuation during the pre-
crisis period (Panel A, Table 4), declining to 87.81 percent during the crisis period (Panel B, Table 4) and 
to as low as 10.78 percent at the peak of the crisis (Panel C, Table 4). Thus, financial shocks are replaced 
with monetary policy shock at the peak of the crisis since monetary policy shock explains as much as 
53.69 percent of corporate spread variability at the peak of the crisis (Panel C, Table 4). Moreover, we 
observe that financial shocks explain as much as 94.86 percent of the entrepreneurs’ net worth 
volatility during the pre-crisis period (Panel A, Table 4), rising to 95.78 percent during the crisis period 
(Panel B, Table 4). This is consistent with Suh and Walker (2016) who find that non-financial variables 
explain less than 5 percent of risk spread, and bank spread in the United States. 




HOW DOES THE FINANCIAL FRICTION MODEL INTERPRET RECENT FINANCIAL CRISES? 
 
Using historical decompositions, we document how the 2008 global financial crisis and the European 
debt crisis are interpreted by the version of the model that accounts for financial friction. These 
decompositions show the contribution of each structural shock to changes in specific variables. The 
individual contributions of each structural shock to the dynamics of output, investment and 
consumption over the sample period are based on the estimates of the various shocks in the DSGE 
model with financial friction. These decompositions are useful as they shed light on how the estimated 
model interpreted specific movements in the observed data, especially during the crucial period of 
2007–2013. 
Given the estimates of the model parameters and the structural shocks we can calculate the 
contribution of the 𝑗𝑗 − 𝑡𝑡ℎ structural shock 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = �𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,1, 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,2, … , 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� to 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑡𝑡ℎ variable 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 =
𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘,1,𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘,2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 by assuming 𝜀𝜀∀𝑙𝑙≠ℎ = 0 in the above MA representation. To obtain the historical 
decomposition from DSGE models, posteriors are estimated with Canada, the Euro Area, U.K., and U.S. 






Although Canada was not at the epicenter of the 2008 global financial crisis, our empirical estimates 
show that their contagion effects operate through various transmission channels. Canada has 
experienced a recession that was less severe and shorter than in the other advanced economies. 
Between the 2008:Q3 and 2009:Q1, Canada slid into a deep recession. The drop in Canada’s GDP that 
occurs over those three quarters (Figure 1) is shorter than the four to six quarters of contraction in the 
other economies. The productivity shock is the most important determinant of recession during 




Figure 1. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Output, Deviation from Trend (%) –Canada– 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 
to changes in the Canadian output. The estimates are based on the DSGE model with financial friction. 
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Shocks related to financial friction, most notably the risk premium shock, play a significant role in 
investment movements in Canada. The contraction in investment during the global financial crisis is 
mostly driven by the risk premium shock. The net worth shock also explains an important share of 
investment downfall, although this role is less prominent. Thus, the risk premium provides a better 
explanation of co-movement between investment and the capital price during the 2008 crisis than 
investment shock (Figure 2).19 
 
 
Figure 2. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Investment, Deviation from Trend (%) –Canada– 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 





Decline in household consumption during 2008:Q1-2008:Q4 is mainly driven by demand shocks, 
notably consumption shock, inflation shock, and government spending shock (Figure 3). This suggests 
that the expansionary fiscal policy adopted to support the economy during the global financial crisis 
has mainly operated through the consumption channel. In contrast, the role played by financial shocks 
in the consumption downfall is mostly insignificant. 
 
 
Figure 3. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Consumption, Deviation from Trend (%) –Canada– 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 




Figure 3 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 







The spread shock is suitable to account for output fluctuations in Euro Area during the pre-crisis and 
the crisis periods (Figure 4). Between 2001 and 2003, the recession was caused by risk premium shock. 
Although the main driving force of output collapse in 2008 was productivity shock, the historical 
decomposition of output shows that financial shocks, especially net worth shock, played a significant 
role in output collapse during the 2008/2009 recession. 
 
 
Figure 4. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Output, Deviation from Trend (%) –Euro Area– 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 4 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 




The risk premium shock has a significantly expansionary effect on investment during 2005-2007 (Figure 
5). However, by 2008:Q1, the risk premium shock’s impact on investment fluctuation had turned 
negative. Figure 5 shows that the link between the financial sector and the real economy operates via 
investment as in Merola (2015). The expansion of investment in 2004-2007 and the contraction 
observed in 2008:Q1 was driven mostly by the risk the premium shock and net worth shock. During 
the European debt crisis, fluctuations in investment were essentially caused by risk premium shocks 













Figure 5. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Investment, Deviation from Trend (%) –Euro Area– 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 5 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 





Figure 6 shows that fluctuations in consumption were driven mostly by productivity and consumption 
shocks during 2008 global financial crisis. However, during the European debt crisis, the risk premium 
shock replaced consumption shock. This is due to the fact that household debt rose and consumption 
contracted significantly during the European debt crisis. Since the beginning of 2010, tensions in the 
sovereigns of many countries in the Eurozone have distorted monetary and credit conditions, 
hindering the ECB monetary policy transmission mechanism and raising the cost of funding to non-
financial companies and households causing a significant decrease in private consumption. 
 
 
Figure 6. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Consumption, Deviation from Trend (%) –Euro Area– 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 6 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 
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Figure 7 shows that the global financial crisis caused the U.K. to slip into recession in 2008. This turning 
point coincided with the collapse of Northern Rock bank in 2007:Q4 which was followed by partial 
nationalization of several other banks. This led to panic among depositors who feared that their 
savings might not be available if Northern Rock went into receivership. 
 
 
Figure 7. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Output, Deviation from Trend (%) -United Kingdom- 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 7 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 
to changes in the U.K. output. The estimates are based on the DSGE model with financial friction. 
U.K. output shrink in 2008 and 2009 (Figure 7). During this recession period, the historical 
decomposition shows that productivity and consumption shocks explain the collapse of output. This 
is in line with the downturn observed in labor productivity at the peak of the crisis (See figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8. Labor Productivity20 Growth –United Kingdom– 
Source: Authors’ calculations from International Financial Statistics 
 




Figure 8 shows that the labor productivity has considerably collapsed during the 2008 global 
financial crisis in the United Kingdom. 
The historical decomposition shows that interest rate shocks limit the decrease of real GDP. This is 
consistent with the accommodative monetary policy in the U.K. in 2008:Q1-2009:Q3. In response to 
the global crisis, the monetary authority implemented a massive expansionary policy. the Bank of 
England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) cut the bank rate in a sequence of steps, from 5% in 




The contraction in investment during 2008:Q4-2009:Q1 is almost completely due to risk premium and 
net worth shocks (Figure 9). This shows the negative impact that the worsening of credit markets has 
on firms’ investment during the 2008 global financial crisis in the U.K. (Akbar, 2013). In the presence of 
capital market imperfections, the availability of finance (internal or external) becomes an important 
determinant of firm’s investment. In a banking crisis situation like in 2008, the availability of finance 
becomes constrained for bank-dependent firms, leading to a misallocation of finance and hence 
investment across businesses. Figure 9 also shows that investment shock and monetary policy shock 
moderate the collapse of investment between 2008:Q1 and 2009:Q2. 
 
 
Figure 9. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Investment, Deviation from Trend (%) –U.K.– 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 9 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 




The decline in consumption at the peak of the crisis is mainly due to productivity and consumption 
shocks (Figure 10). Between 2008:Q2 and 2009:Q2, these two shocks account for more than 50% of 
household consumption collapse. This finding is not surprising, suggesting that private consumption 











Figure 10. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Consumption, Deviation from Trend (%) –U.K.– 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 10 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 






In 2008/2009, the U.S. economy has experienced a crisis that was led by the derivatives market and 
the subprime mortgage crisis. The empirical estimates show that the net worth shock account for a 
significant portion of the decline in output at the peak of the crisis (Figure 11). Historical decomposition 
of output accords well with the considerable damage that the financial crisis inflicted to the U.S. 
economy between 2007:Q3–2009:Q1. However, the model is unable to explain the tightening of credit 
that has dramatically impeded GDP growth as in Merola (2015) and Suh and Walker (2016). Figure 11 
shows that productivity shock is the most important driver of the downturn in output during 2008:Q4. 
 
 
Figure 11. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Output, Deviation from Trend (%) –United States– 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 11 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 










Figure 12 shows that financial shocks play a vital role in explaining investment fluctuation before and 
during the financial crisis period. The historical decomposition in Figure 12 reveals that the net worth 
shocks impacts investment negatively both during the pre-crisis period of 2004:Q2–2006:Q1 and 
during the crisis. In fact, the role of investment specific shocks in explaining investment is considerably 
reduced because of their counterfactual effect on asset prices. By contrast, the risk premium shock 
impacts investment positively during the pre-crisis period and negatively during the crisis period. 
Overall, these findings align with those of Suh and Walker (2016) who show that the risk premium 
provides a better explanation of co-movement between investment and the price of capital during the 
2008 crisis than investment shock. 
 
 
Figure 12. Historical Decomposition, Changes in Investment, Deviation from Trend (%) -US- 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 12 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 




Consumption shock and productivity shock play a significant role in consumption contraction in 
2008:Q4 (Figure 13). The contribution of consumption shock reflects the sharp increase in the desire 
of households to save for precautionary reasons rather than spend. Our historical decomposition 
results are similar to those of Hall (2010) which suggest that consumption of nondurables fell sharply 
in 2008. Because of decreased incomes, many consumers decided to cut back on cash outlays for 
durables and new houses. This is consistent with the finding of Lee et al. (2010) who show that the U.S 
household consumption rate has declined in late 2008 as the savings rate rose to around 6 percent of 
disposable personal income from nearly 5 percent in 2009. Compared to the pre-crisis years (2003-07), 













Figure 13. Historical Decomposition Changes in Consumption, Deviation from Trend (%) –United 
States– 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 13 depicts the historical decomposition to examine the contribution of each structural shock 
to changes in the U.S. consumption. The estimates are based on the DSGE model with financial friction. 
 
MAIN FINDINGS ACROSS THE WORLD 
 
A major result concerns the fact that during the crisis period, financial frictions raise investment 
adjustment costs significantly across the world but the magnitude is not the same. We find that the 
increase is more pronounced in the Euro Area (31.52%) and U.S. (28.98%) than in Canada (24.86%) and 
the U.K. (17.56%). This finding implies that corporate investment in the Euro Area and U.S. was more 
exposed to the worsening condition in the credit market during the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Another important finding is that, during the financial crises, the effects of financial shocks are 
more pronounced in driving investment than output across the world. By contrast to the study of 
Merola (2015), we introduce the net worth shock in our DSGE model. The results show that the 
contribution of this shock to investment fluctuations tend to supplant that of the risk premium shock 
because of their counterfactual effects on asset prices. This finding is similar to that of Christiano et al. 
(2014), showing that, in the presence of financial frictions, a good share of investment variance in the 
United States is explained by the net worth shocks. The downfall observed in the historical 
decompositions of output is mainly attributed to a negative productivity shock. Private consumption 
is mainly explained by preferences shocks and productivity shocks. The impact relatively increases 
during the crisis period, suggesting that households make their adjustment whether to spend or not 
when economic outlook is not good. In addition, the importance of productivity shock increases since 
the output’s contraction constraint the choices of consumers. 
We can see in our empirical estimates that financial shocks play a more important role in the Euro 
Area and U.S. than in Canada during the recent crises. The joint contribution of the risk premium shock 
and net worth shock in investment variation increases more in the Euro Area and U.S. during the crises. 
This is in line with the losses related to the U.S. sub-prime mortgages. A number of financial institutions 
in the United States and elsewhere either went bankrupt or received government support. Banks 
became increasingly wary of lending to each other due to fear that other institutions will be unable to 
repay their loans, thereby raising the cost of inter-bank loans. The higher cost of raising cash, coupled 
with the need to make their balance sheets look better, resulted in reduced bank lending less and 
higher interest rates. This “credit crunch” in turn led a sharp decline in in consumption and 
investments, giving rise to fears of a worldwide recession. The heavy exposure of a number of Euro 
Area countries to the U.S. sub-prime saga is clearly revealed in the summer of 2007 when BNP Paribas 
froze redemptions for three investment funds, citing its inability to value structured products.




Compared to other industrialized countries such as the U.S., Canada’s financial system was 
relatively less affected by the global financial crisis. One main reason is that the regulatory framework 
for the Canadian financial sector is both more responsive and more prudent, in some respects, than 
that of the United States. Compared to their American counterparts, Canadian banks were less active 
in the sub-prime lending and securitization activities that were at the center of the financial crisis. For 
example, sub-prime loans accounted for less than 5% of new mortgages in Canada in 2006 compared 




The objective of the paper was to examine whether the recent financial crises enhanced the role 
played by financial frictions and financial shocks on business fluctuations in Canada, the Euro Area, the 
U.K., and the U.S. using an improved version of the DSGE methodology described in Merola (2015). We 
found that lenders became more sensitive to the deterioration of corporate balance sheets during the 
recent financial crises and reacted by raising the EFP for high-risk corporate firms globally. This 
situation worsened credit market conditions by dampening the quantity of credit available to 
borrowers and increasing borrowing costs. Investment was the macroeconomic variable most 
affected by the deterioration of financial market frictions. Variance decomposition results show that 
the contribution of financial friction and financial shocks in driving investment increased notably 
during the crisis period. The historical decomposition was able to replicate the effects of financial 
shocks on investment but not necessarily on output during the 2008 global crisis. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Akbar et al. (2013) who analyzed how shocks to the supply of credit 
during the global financial crisis affected the financing and investment policies of private businesses 
in the U.K. and found that credit contraction had negatively impacted the performance and 
investment of private firms. Finally, this study found that financial friction and financial shocks 
significantly affected international businesses through investment. 
 Our empirical estimates show that financial frictions did not exert significant effects on the 
macroeconomy in Canada during the recent financial crises and this may be because of Canada’s 
restrictive regulatory rules of the financial sector. One policy implication of this finding is that 
restrictive regulatory rules in the financial sector can be helpful in protecting the economy against 
financial shocks during financial crises. Moreover, our results seem to imply that governments may be 
able to boost the economy by making important investments during periods of financial crises. More 
specifically, our empirical findings suggest that financial frictions mainly impact the real economy 
through the investment channel. It follows, therefore, that additional public investments should be 
encouraged since they can substantially temperate the recession effects of financial frictions when 
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A.1) Data Description and Sources 
 













Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted, 
Annualized Rate- 




Household Consumption Expenditure, incl. NPISHs, 










Wage Hourly Earnings: Manufacturing for the United States, Index 2010=1, Seasonally Adjusted 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis 
Labor Employment, Number of persons International Financial Statistics 






Money Market Rate International Financial Statistics 
Corporate Spread  C0A4-C0A1 BofA ML US Corporates BBB-AAA, Rated    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 




















Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted, 
Annualized Rate- 






Household Consumption Expenditure, incl. NPISHs, 










Wage Hourly Earnings: Manufacturing for the United States, Index 2010=1, Seasonally Adjusted 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis 
Labor Employment, Number of persons International Financial Statistics 






Money Market Rate International Financial Statistics 
Corporate Spread  UR40-UR10 BofA ML Sterling Corporates BBB-AAA Rated  
Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis 
Net Worth Footsie 100 index Bloomberg 
 
   
E. Martial Etoundi Atenga, M. Hassan Abdo, and M. Mougoué                                                        American Business Review 24(2) 
__________________________________________________ 
 













Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted, 
Annualized Rate- 




Household Consumption Expenditure, incl. NPISHs, 










Wage Hourly Earnings: Manufacturing for the United States, Index 2010=1, Seasonally Adjusted 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis 
Labor Employment, Number of persons International Financial Statistics 






Money Market Rate International Financial Statistics 
Corporate Spread  F0C4-F0C1 BofA ML Canadian Corporates BBB-AAA, Rated    Bloomberg 




















Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted, 
Annualized Rate- 






Household Consumption Expenditure, incl. NPISHs, 










Wage Hourly Earnings: Manufacturing for the United States, Index 2010=1, Seasonally Adjusted 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis 
Labor Employment, Number of persons International Financial Statistics 






Money Market Rate International Financial Statistics 
Corporate Spread  UR40-UR10 BofA ML Sterling Corporates BBB-AAA Rated  Bloomberg 








E. Martial Etoundi Atenga, M. Hassan Abdo, and M. Mougoué                                                        American Business Review 24(2) 
__________________________________________________ 
 
  99 
A.2) Definition of Data Variables 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = [𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺/𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺)] × 100  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 = [𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶/𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺)] × 100  
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = [𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼/𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺)] × 100  
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